Introduction
As computer networks continue to grow, it becomes increasingly more important to automate the process of evaluating their vulnerability to attacks. Despite the best efforts of software architects and developers, network hosts inevitably contain a number of vulnerabilities. Hence, it is not feasible for a network administrator to remove all vulnerabilities present in the network hosts. Therefore, the recent focus in security of such networks is on analysis of vulnerabilities globally, finding exploits that are more critical, and preventing them to thwart an intruder. When evaluating the security of a network, it is rarely enough to consider the presence or absence of isolated vulnerabilities. This is because intruders often combine exploits against multiple vulnerabilities in order to reach their goals (Abadi & Jalili, 2005) . For example, an intruder might exploit the vulnerability of a particular version of FTP to overwrite the .rhosts file on a victim host. In the next step, the intruder could remotely log in to the victim. In a subsequent step, the intruder could use the victim host as a base to launch another exploit on a new victim, and so on. (Phillips & Swiler, 1998) proposed the concept of attack graphs, where each node represents a possible attack state. Edges represent a change of state caused by a single action taken by the intruder. used a modified version of the model checker NuSMV (NuSMV, 2010) to produce attack graphs. (Ammann et al., 2002) introduced a monotonicity assumption and used it to develop a polynomial algorithm to encode all of the edges in an attack graph without actually computing the graph itself. These attack graphs are essentially similar to (Phillips & Swiler, 1998) , where any path in the graph from an initial node to a goal node shows a sequence of exploits that an intruder can launch to reach his goal. (Noel et al., 2005) presented a number of techniques for managing attack graph complexity through visualization. (Mehta et al., 2006) presented a ranking scheme for the nodes of an attack graph. Rank of a node shows its importance based on factors like the probability of an intruder reaching that node. Given a ranked attack graph, the system administrator can concentrate on relevant subgraphs to figure out how to start deploying security measures. (Ou et al., 2006) presented logical attack graphs, which directly illustrate logical dependencies among attack goals and configuration information. Their attack graph generation tool builds upon MulVAL (Ou et al., 2005) , a network security analyzer based on logical programming. The aim of minimization analysis of network attack graphs is to find a minimum critical set of exploits that completely disconnect the initial nodes and the goal nodes of the graph.
resulting algorithm is referred to as a gbest PSO. When smaller neighbourhoods are used, the algorithm is generally referred to as a lbest PSO (Kennedy et al., 2001) . The performance of each particle is measured using a predefined fitness function, which is related to the problem to be solved. Each particle in the swarm has a current position, i x , a velocity (rate of position change), i v , and a personal best position, i y . The personal best position of particle i shows the best fitness reached by that particle at a given time. Let f be the objective function to be maximized. Then the personal best position of a particle at iteration or time step t is updated as
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For the gbest model, the best particle is determined from the entire swarm by selecting the best personal best position. This position is denoted as ŷ. The equation that manipulates the velocity is called the velocity update equation and is stated as
where (1 ) ij vt + is the velocity updated for the jth dimension, j = 1, 2, …, d. 1 c and 2 c are the acceleration constants, where the first moderates the maximum step size towards the best personal of the particle, while the second moderates the maximum step size towards the global best particle in just one iteration. 1 () j rt and 2 () j rt are two random values in the range [0,1] and give the PSO algorithm a stochastic search property. Velocity updates on each dimension can be clamped with a user defined maximum velocity V max , which would prevent them from exploding, thereby causing premature convergence (Eberhart et al., 1996) ; (Shi, 2004) . Each particle updates its position using the following equation:
In swarm terminology, particle i is flying to its new position (1 ) i xt + . After the new position is calculated for each particle, the iteration counter increases and the new particle positions are evaluated. This process is repeated until some convergence criteria is satisfied. (Kennedy & Eberhart, 1997) have adapted PSO to search in binary spaces. For binary PSO, the elements of i x , i y and ŷ can only take the values 0 and 1. The velocity i v is interpreted as a probability to change a bit from 0 to 1, or from 1 to 0 when updating the position of particles. Therefore, the velocity vector remains continuous-valued. Since each ij v is a real value, a mapping needs to be defined from ij v to a probability in the range [0,1]. This is done by using a sigmoid function to squash velocities into a [0,1] range. The sigmoid function is defined as
The equation for updating positions is then replaced by the following probabilistic update equation:
rt is a random value in the range [0,1]. In binary PSO, the meaning and behaviour of velocity clamping differ substantially from real-valued PSO. With the velocity interpreted as a probability of change, velocity clamping, V max , sets the minimal probability for a bit to change its value from 0 to 1, or from 1 to 0 (Engelbrecht, 2005) . In this paper, we use the gbest model of binary PSO for minimization analysis of network attack graphs.
Network security model
Our network security model is a tuple (S, H, C, T, E, M, R) , where S is a set of services, H is a set of hosts connected to the network, C is a relation expressing connectivity between hosts, T is a relation expressing trust between hosts, E is a set of individual known exploits that intruder can use to construct attack scenarios, M is a set of countermeasures that must be implemented to prevent exploits, and R is a model of intruder.
Services
Each service sS ∈ is a pair (, ) svn p , where svn is the service name and p is the port on which the service is listening.
Hosts
Each host hH ∈ is a tuple (, , , ) id svcs plvl vuls , where id is a unique host identifier, svcs is a set of services running on the host, plvl is the level of privilege that the intruder has on the host, and vuls is a set of host-specific vulnerable components. For simplicity, we only consider three privilege levels: none, user, and root.
Network Connectivity
Network connectivity is modelled as a relation C HHP ⊆××, where P is a set of port numbers. Each network connectivity cC ∈ is a triple ( s h , t h , p ), where s h is the source host, t h is the target host, and p is the target port number. Note that the connectivity relation incorporates network elements such as firewalls that restrict the ability of one host to connect to another.
Trust Relationships
Trust relationships are modelled as a relation TH H ⊆×, where (,) ts Th h indicates that a user may log in from host s h to host t h without authentication.
Exploits
Each exploit eE ∈ is a tuple ( pre , s h , t h , post ), where pre is a list of conditions that must hold before launching the exploit, s h is the host from which the exploit is launched, t h is the host targeted by the exploit, and post specifies the effects of exploit on the network. An exploit eE ∈ is inevitable if its prevention is not feasible or incurs high cost. The set of inevitable exploits is denoted by I .
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Countermeasures
To prevent an exploit eE ∈ , the security analyst must implement a suitable countermeasure mM ∈ , such as • changing the firewall configuration • patching the vulnerability that made this exploit possible • deploying a host-based or network-based intrusion detection and prevention system • modifying the configuration of network services and applications • deleting user accounts • changing access rights • setting up a virtual private network (VPN)
Intruder
The intruder has some knowledge about the target network, such as known vulnerabilities, user passwords, and information gathered with port scans. The intruder's knowledge is modelled as a relation RI D P W V U L I N F ⊆× × × , where ID is a set of host identifiers, PW is a set of user passwords, VUL is a set of known vulnerabilities, and INF is a set of information gathered through port scans and operating system identification techniques. 
Minimization analysis of network attack graphs
Definition 3. Partial Hit Value
Let U E ⊆ be a subset of exploits. For each exploit j eU ∉ , the partial hit value (,) pj hv e U is defined to be the number of attack scenarios that are hit by j e , but that are not hit by any exploit in U .
Definition 4. Exclusive Hit Value
Let UE ⊆ be a subset of exploits. For each exploit j eU ∈ , the exclusive hit value (,)
xj hv e U is defined to be the number of attack scenarios that are hit by j e , but that are not hit by any exploit in \{ } j Ue .
Definition 5. Critical Set of Exploits
A subset of exploits
\ CE E I ⊆ is critical if and only if all attack scenarios are hit by the exploits in it. Equivalently, CE is critical if and only if every complete path from an initial node to a goal node of the network attack graph G has at least one edge labelled with an exploit j eC E ∈ .
Definition 6. Minimal Critical Set of Exploits
A critical set of exploits CE is minimal if it contains no redundant exploit.
Definition 7. Minimum Critical Set of Exploits
A critical set of exploits CE is minimum if there is no critical set of exploits CE′ such that CE CE ′ < . 
Definition 8. Critical Set of Countermeasures
Definition 10. Minimum Critical Set of Countermeasures
A critical set of countermeasures CM is minimum if there is no critical set of countermeasures CM′ such that CM CM ′ < . In general, there can be multiple minimum critical set of exploits/countermeasures. We can now state formally two problems: MCEP and MCCP ; .
Definition 11. Minimum Critical Set of Exploits Problem (MCEP)
Given a network attack graph G and a set of exploits E , find a minimum critical subset of exploits \ CE E I ⊆ for G .
Definition 12. Minimum Critical Set of Countermeasures Problem (MCCP)
Given a network attack graph G , a set of exploits E , and a set of countermeasures M , find a minimum critical subset of countermeasures CM M ⊆ for G .
There is a trivial reduction from MCEP to MCCP, and vice versa. Given an instance (,) GE of MCEP, we can construct an instance (,, ) 
A typical process for solving MCEP or MCCP is shown in Fig. 1 . First, vulnerability scanning tools, such as Nessus (Deraison, 2010) , determine vulnerabilities of individual hosts. Using this vulnerability information along with exploit templates, intruder's goals, and other information about the network, such as connectivity between hosts, a network attack graph is generated. In this directed graph, each complete path from an initial node to a goal node corresponds to an attack scenario. The minimization analysis of the network attack graph determines a minimum critical set of exploits/countermeasures that must be prevented/implemented to guarantee no attack scenario is possible. 
ParticleNAG
In this section, we present ParticleNAG, a memetic particle swarm optimization algorithm for minimization analysis of large-scale network attack graphs. The aim of minimization analysis of network attack graphs is to find a minimum critical set of exploits/ countermeasures. This problem is in fact a constrained optimization problem in which the objective is to find a solution with minimum cardinality and the constraint is that the solution must be critical (i.e., it must hit all attack scenarios). Fig. 2 shows the pseudo-code of ParticleNAG. The first step is to initialize the swarm and control parameters. Then repeated iterations of the algorithm are executed until some termination condition is met (e.g., a maximum number of iterations is reached). Within each iteration, if each particle's current position x i does not represent a critical set of exploits, a greedy repair algorithm is applied to it. Then redundant exploits of x i are eliminated. After that, x i is improved by a local search heuristic procedure. Then the particle's personal best position y i is updated using equation (1). The global best position ŷ is then determined from the entire swarm by selecting the best personal best position. Finally, the velocity and the position of each particle are updated using equations (2) and (5). { }
be the set of attack scenarios represented by the network attack graph G. The attack scenario k SS ∈ is hit by the particle position i x if ki SE ≠ ∅ ∩ . The particle position i x represents a critical set of exploits if all attack scenarios are hit by it. The aim of minimization analysis of network attack graphs is to find a minimum critical set of exploits. So ParticleNAG uses the following fitness function to evaluate the quality of i x :
Greedy repair
The set of exploits represented by a particle position x i may not be critical. In other words, it may not hit all attack scenarios. Let i E be the set of exploits represented by a particle position i x . As shown in Fig. 3 
The selection value is used to evaluate candidate redundant exploits of a critical set of exploits in order to choose a candidate redundant exploit to be removed from it.
procedure In Fig. 4 an algorithm is presented, which can be used to eliminate redundant exploits of i x . Let i E be the critical set of exploits represented by i x . The algorithm is based on the idea that it is good to remove an exploit k e from i E if k e is a candidate redundant exploit and hits attack scenarios that are hit by too many other exploits in i E . Hence, at each step, the algorithm chooses a candidate redundant exploit k e from i R that maximizes the selection value (,) ki sv e E . It then removes k e from i E and changes its corresponding element ik x to 0. This is repeated until a minimal critical set of exploits is obtained.
Local search heuristic
Combining global and local search is a strategy used by many successful global optimization approaches. In ParticleNAG, a local search heuristic is applied to the current position of each particle to improve them before their personal best positions are updated. The local search heuristic is based on the following idea: given a particle position i x and its corresponding critical set of exploits 
Experiments
In order to evaluate the performance of ParticleNAG, we performed our experiments over a sample network attack graph and several randomly generated large-scale network attack graphs.
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Sample network attack graph
Consider the network shown in Fig. 6 . There are three target hosts called RedHat, Windows and Fedora on an internal network, and a host called PublicServer on an isolated demilitarized zone (DMZ) network. One firewall separates the internal network from the DMZ and another firewall separates the DMZ from the rest of the Internet. A number of services are running on each of the hosts of RedHat, Windows, Fedora, and PublicServer. Also, each of the above hosts has a number of vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scanning tools such as Nessus (Deraison, 2010) can be used to find the vulnerabilities of each host. The RedHat host on the internal network is running FTP and SSH services. The Fedora host is Table 2 . Network connectivity information
The intruder launches his attack starting from a single host, Intruder, which lies on the outside network. His goal is to disrupt the database service on the host Fedora. To achieve this goal, the intruder should gain the root privilege on this host. There are wdir, fshell, and sshd_bof vulnerabilities on the RedHat host, scripting vulnerability on the Windows host, wdir, fshell, squid_conf, and licq_ivv vulnerabilities on the Fedora host, and iis_bof and exchange_ivv on the PublicServer host. Also, at and xterm programs on the RedHat and Fedora are vulnerable to buffer overflow. The intruder can use ten generic exploits, described as follows:
• iis_r2r Buffer overflow vulnerability in the Microsoft IIS web server allows remote intruders to gain root shell on the target host.
• exchange_r2u
The OLE component in the Microsoft Exchange mail server does not properly validate the lengths of messages for certain OLE data, which allows remote intruders to execute arbitrary code.
• squid_ps
The intruder can use a misconfigured Squid web proxy to conduct unauthorized activities such as port scanning.
• licq_r2u
The intruder can send a specially crafted URL to the LICQ client to execute arbitrary commands on the target host.
• script_r2u
Microsoft Internet Explorer allows remote intruders to execute arbitrary code via malformed Content-Disposition and Content-Type header fields that cause the www.intechopen.com application for the spoofed file type to pass the file back to the operating system for handling rather than raise an error message.
• ssh_r2r
Buffer overflow vulnerability in the SSH server allows remote intruders to gain root shell on the target host.
• ftp_rhosts
Using FTP vulnerability, the intruder creates a .rhosts file in the FTP home directory, creating a remote login trust relationship between his host and the target host.
• rsh_r2u
Using an existing remote login trust relationship between two hosts, the intruder logs in from one machine to another, getting a user shell without supplying a password.
• xterm_u2r
Buffer overflow vulnerability in the xterm program allows local users to gain root shell on the target host.
• at_u2r
Buffer overflow vulnerability in the at program allows local users to gain root shell on the target host. In Table 3 , each generic exploit is represented by its preconditions and postconditions. More information about each of the exploits is available in (NVD, 2010) . Before an exploit can be used, its preconditions must be met. Each exploit will increase the network vulnerability if it is successful. Among the ten generic exploits shown in Table 3 , the first eight generic exploits require a pair of hosts and the last two generic exploits require only one host. Therefore, there are 8 * 5 * 4 + 2 * 4 = 168 exploits in total, which the intruder can try. Each attack scenario for the above network consists of a subset of these 168 exploits. For example, consider the following attack scenario: 1. iis_r2r(Intruder, PublicServer) 2. squid_ps(PublicServer, Fedora) 3. licq_r2u(PublicServer, Fedora) 4. xterm_u2r (Fedora, Fedora) The intruder first launches the iis_r2r exploit to gain root privilege on the PublicServer host. Then he uses the PublicServer host to launch a port scan via the vulnerable Squid web proxy running on the Fedora host. The scan discovers that it is possible to gain user privilege on the Fedora host with launching the licq_r2u exploit. After that, a simple local buffer overflow gives the intruder root privilege on the Fedora host. The attack graph for the above network consists of 164 attack scenarios. Each attack scenario consists of between 4 to 9 exploits.
Experimental Results
We applied ParticleNAG for minimization analysis of the above network attack graph. To evaluate the performance of the algorithm, we performed several experiments. In the first experiment, we assumed that all exploits are preventable. Therefore, the aim was to find a minimum critical set of exploits among 168 exploits. Using ParticleNAG, the following minimum critical set of exploits was found: In the second experiment, we assumed that the generic exploits iis_r2r, exchange_r2u, and xterm_u2r are inevitable, i.e., the prevention of them is not feasible or incurs high cost. Therefore, the aim was to find a minimum critical set of exploits among 124 exploits. Using ParticleNAG, the following minimum critical set of exploits was found: Fedora) , licq_r2u(RedHat, Fedora), script_r2u(PublicServer, Windows), ftp_rhosts(PublicServer, Fedora), ftp_rhosts(RedHat, Fedora) } It should be mentioned that the exact cardinality of the minimum critical set of exploits for this network attack graph is 5, so the above critical set of exploits found by ParticleNAG is minimum. While using ApproxNAG ; , the following minimum critical set of exploits was found: Windows) , at_u2r(Fedora, Fedora), sshd_r2u(PublicServer, RedHat), ftp_rhosts(PublicServer, RedHat), squid_ps(PublicServer, Fedora), ftp_rhosts(PublicServer, Fedora) }
The second experiment shows ParticleNAG can find a critical set of exploits with less cardinality.
In the experiments, the parameters were set to c 1 = 2, c 2 = 2, and V max = 4, which are values commonly used in the binary PSO literature. The swarm size was set to m = 10 and the maximum number of iterations was set to t max = 50.
Large-scale network attack graphs
A large computer network builds upon multiple platforms, runs different software packages and supports several modes of connectivity. Despite the best efforts of software architects and developers, each network host inevitably contains a number of vulnerabilities. Several factors can make network attack graphs larger so that finding a minimum critical set of exploits/countermeasures becomes more difficult. An obvious factor is the size of the network under analysis. Our society has become increasingly dependent on networked computers and the trend towards larger networks will continue. For example, there are enterprises today consisting of tens of thousands of hosts. Also, less secure networks clearly have larger network attack graphs. Each network host might have several exploitable vulnerabilities. When considered across an enterprise, especially given global internet connectivity, network attack graphs become potentially large (Ammann et al., 2005) . In order to further evaluate the performance of ParticleNAG, we randomly generated 14 large-scale network attack graphs, denoted by 1 NAG , 2 NAG , ...,
14
NAG . For each network attack graph, we considered different values for the cardinalities of E and S , where E is the set of preventable exploits and S is the set of attack scenarios represented by the network attack graph. In 1 NAG , ..., 7 NAG , attack scenarios consists of between 3 to 9 exploits, while in 8 NAG , ..., 14 NAG , attack scenarios consists of between 3 to 12 exploits. Table 4 shows the cardinality of the set of preventable exploits, the cardinality of the set of attack scenarios, and the average cardinality of attack scenarios for each generated large-scale network attack graph. 
Experimental results
We applied ParticleNAG for minimization analysis of the above large-scale network attack graphs. We performed 10 runs of the algorithm with different random seeds and reported the best cardinality and the average cardinality of critical sets of exploits obtained from these 10 runs. We also applied ApproxNAG ; , AntNAG (Abadi & Jalili, 2006) , and GenNAG (Abadi & Jalili, 2008) for minimization analysis of the above network attack graphs. As shown in Table 5 , ParticleNAG outperforms all the algorithms referenced above and finds a critical set of exploits with less cardinality. On average, the cardinalities of critical sets of exploits found by ParticleNAG, AntNAG, GenNAG are, respectively, 10.77, 9.21, and 8.95 percent less than the cardinality of critical set of exploits of exploits found by ApproxNAG. Accordingly, we conclude that ParticleNAG is more efficient than ApproxNAG, AntNAG, and GenNAG.
In ParticleNAG experiments, the parameters were set to c 1 = 2, c 2 = 2, and V max = 4, which are values commonly used in the binary PSO literature. The swarm size was set to m = 20 and the maximum number of iterations was set to t max = 100. NAG , respectively. As it can be seen in these figures, ParticleNAG is able to quickly converge to a good solution for large-scale network attack graphs and can maintain the balance between the exploration and exploitation reasonably well in comparison to AntNAG and GenNAG.
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Algorithm parameters
We performed experiments to analyze the effect of different settings of parameters on the performance of ParticleNAG. The effect of using the local search heuristic on the performance of ParticleNAG was analyzed by comparing the results of running the algorithm with and without the local search heuristic. Figures 11 and 12 show the progress of the average cardinality of the global As the figures show, ParticleNAG significantly performs better than ParticleNAG without the local search heuristic and finds a critical set of exploits with less cardinality. This is because before updating the personal best position of a particle, its current position is improved by the local search heuristic. Hence, the personal best position of the particle shows a locally optimized solution.
To analyze the effect of the swarm size on the performance of ParticleNAG, the algorithm was run with the parameter settings from Section 6.2 but this time with the swarm size, m, set to 2, 5, 15, and 20, respectively. As it can be seen in Table 6 , when using a very small number of particles, ParticleNAG shows a poor performance. This is because the fewer the number of particles, the less the 
Conclusions
Each attack scenario is a sequence of exploits launched by an intruder for a particular goal.
To prevent an exploit, the security analyst must implement a suitable countermeasure such as the firewall configuration or patch the vulnerabilities that made this exploit possible. The collection of possible attack scenarios in a computer network can be represented by a directed graph, called network attack graph. In this directed graph, each path from an initial node to a goal node corresponds to an attack scenario. The aim of minimization analysis of network attack graphs is to find a minimum critical set of exploits/countermeasures so that by preventing/implementing them the intruder cannot reach his goal using any attack scenarios. This problem is in fact a constrained optimization problem in which the objective is to find a solution with minimum cardinality and the constraint is that the solution must be critical. Several factors can make network attack graphs larger so that finding a minimum critical set of exploits/countermeasures becomes more difficult. An obvious factor is the size of the network under analysis. Our society has become increasingly dependent on networked computers and the trend towards larger networks will continue. Also, less secure networks clearly have larger network attack graphs. Each network host might have several exploitable vulnerabilities. When considered across an enterprise, especially given global internet connectivity, network attack graphs become potentially large. Particle swarm optimization (PSO) is a population based stochastic optimization algorithm that was inspired by social behaviour of flocks of birds when they are searching for food. While evolutionary algorithms take inspiration from biological evolution, memetic algorithms mimic cultural evolution. The term meme refers to a unit of cultural information that can be transmitted from one mind to another after reinterpretation and improvement that in the context of combinatorial optimization corresponds to local search. In this paper, we presented a memetic particle swarm optimization algorithm, called ParticleNAG, for minimization analysis of network attack graphs. A greedy repair method was used to convert the constrained optimization problem into an unconstrained one. We reported the results of applying ParticleNAG for minimization analysis of 14 large-scale network attack graphs. We also applied an approximation algorithm, ApproxNAG ; , an ant colony optimization algorithm, AntNAG (Abadi & Jalili, 2006) , and a genetic algorithm, GenNAG (Abadi & Jalili, 2008) , for minimization analysis of the above large-scale network attack graphs. On average, the cardinality of critical sets of exploits found by ParticleNAG was 10.77 percent less than the cardinality of critical sets of exploits found by ApproxNAG. Also, ParticleNAG performed better than AntNAG and GenNAG in terms of convergence speed and accuracy.
We performed experiments to analyze the effect of swarm size and local search heuristic on the performance of ParticleNAG. The results of experiments showed that ParticleNAG significantly performs better than ParticleNAG without the local search heuristic.
